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1 Introduction 
The literature on income transfer goes as far back to Keynes (1929) , where he argued that the 
German reparation payments after WWI had caused a decrease in its terms of trade, known as the 
orthodox view. Jones (1970) took the literature to a new direction and presented a number of cases 
where , in absence of trade barriers , an income transfer could result in an increase in donor's terms 
of trade and therefore pioneered an unorthodox and somewhat paradoxical view. His paper deals 
more with presumption and bias about the effects of the terms of trade of the transferring country 
than the actual effect. That is , the orthodox bias is that the terms of trade of the donor country is 
deteriorated following a transfer. Jones (1970) sets out to reverse that bias on the premise that "the 
real income loss represented by the transfer at initial prices may be mitigated by the 'secondary' 
effects of an improvement in the terms of trade." 
The literature continues to this day and it has taken a number of different avenues. Jones (1975) 
reconsidered the effect of income transfer on terms of trade by assuming the existence of non traded 
goods. Jones (1975) found that the different degrees of demand and supply disparities between 
countries is a prorninent factor in det ermining the effects on a transferring country's tenns of trade. 
As well, price sensitivity, both of demanders and producers, as a cause of trade strongly impacts 
terms of trade in a transfer where a non traded good is present. Brecher and Bhagwati (1981), 
Bhagwati et al. (1983) and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1984) indicated the conditions under which 
an income transfer would be immiserizing for the recipient country, thus establishing the welfare 
paradox. Brecher and Bhagwati (1981) made a clear distinction between foreign and national 
income in an economy where foreign ownership is present. When the national and aggregate 
incomes differ , the recipient country experiences a decrease in national welfare , which is contrary to 
the standard results. This immiserizing growth is also shown to occur in stable markets. Bhagwati 
et al. (1983) generalized these results by claiming that this paradox (immiserizing growth to the 
recipient of the transfer) can only occur with market stability if there are certain " distortions" in 
that economy. They set up a three-agent n10del, where two of the agents engage in a bilateral 
transfer , and the third outside agent is included in order to simulate a multilateral environment . 
After implementing the conditions of the immiserizing growth, though it appeared as if there were 
no distortions , in fact , the absence of optimal taxation existed as the said distortion. Hence, the 
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generalization was established. 
Kemp and Kojima (1985) and Schweinberger (1990), among others, investigated welfare paradox 
of an income transfer when such aid is tied. Kemp and Kojima (1985) verified that perverse 
outcomes occur in the presence of market stability when dealing with tied aid on the part of the 
recipient or donor. Unlike previous literature establishing the welfare paradox, their work is not 
reliant on an additional country or commodity. Schweinberger (1990) offered a slightly alternative 
~odel to Kemp and Kojima (1985). He claimed the effects of the tied aid puts constraint on the 
spending of the private sector's income. A surprising result of his model is that if aid is tied in the 
donor's export market, the donor paradox (enrichment to the donor) cannot occur. Beladi (1990) 
reexarnines the welfare effects of international transfers in a two country general equilibrium model 
of trade in the presence of generalized unemployment. In this context he derives the necessary 
conditions for the occurrence of paradoxical as well as normal results on employment as well as 
welfare. Lahiri and Raimondos (1995) considered the welfare effects of aid tied to quantitative trade 
restrictions. They found that these quantitative distortions do not of themselves cause a transfer 
paradox because unlike price distortions, quotas alone do not bring distortions into other markets. 
In the case of quantitative trade restrictions, the transfer paradox only occurs with quota reform and 
only as a result of the welfare changes associated with that reform. Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 
(1997) investigated foreign aid tied to tariff reforms. They presented conditions where Pareto-
improvement occurs for the recipient and donor countries as well as the third outside country not 
involved in the transfer. By tying aid to changes in tariffs , they showed that theoretically, a certain 
level of welfare can be attained in the donor country, while the tariff reduction will not cause the 
recipient country's tariff revenue to decrease. Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995) assumed that the 
recipient used foreign aid to finance a public consumption good, and they investigated the impact 
on terms of trade of both the recipient and donor. They also showed that the income transfer could 
be welfare enriching for the donor and welfare immiserizing for the recipient. In addition to this, 
they showed that a transfer can increase or decrease world welfare, thus improving or worsening the 
welfare of both countries. Yano and Nugent (1999) examined the impact of development aid on the 
wslfaf€:l of a small open economy in presence of nontraded goods (as a significant ameunt of aid is 
spent on nontraded infrastructures) and demonstrated that welfare paradox can take place. They 
claimed that the expansion of nontraded sectors can outweigh the benefits of aid and therefore 
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could result in welfare paradox. However , Choi (2003) indicated, in a set up with two factors 
two tradeable goods and a nontraded good, the terms of trade for a small economy cannot be 
deteriorated. Thus he claimed that Yano and Nugent (1999) condition on nontraded good sector 
is not necessary. 
More recently, Abe and Takarada (2005) attempted to resolve some of the issues surrounding 
the dispute between Kemp and Kojima (1985) and Schweinberger (1990). Their model of tied 
aid showed that when the households of the recipient country have knowledge of the transfers 
and have the ability to trade the purchased goods, no transfer paradoxes occur in the context 
of normal commodities. Kemp (2005) extended the theory of tied aid by creating a model that is 
compatible with non-tradable public consumption goods. He argued that with private consumption 
goods households can resell the aid on world markets , essentially "untying" the aid. The transfer 
paradox, in this context , still exists. Torsvik (2005) examined the implications of donor cooperation 
and mutual aid policy. He showed that donor cooperation is always beneficial when aid contracts 
are used. When contracts are not used, however, cooperation can harm the donor countries involved 
in the transfer. Alesina and Dollar (2000) studied the trends of foreign aid allocation. They find 
that political strategy plays a role as significant as the economic needs of the recipient countries 
in determining who gets what aid. The study reveals that all other things constant, democratic 
countries are granted more aid. And although politics strongly influence foreign aid allocation, the 
economics of recipient countries significantly stimulate foreign direct investments. 
The purpose of this paper is to raise an entirely different question: Does foreign aid crowd out 
foreign investment, given that the foreign aid is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption 
good? On the one hand, the recipient countries are often poor developing countries. On the 
other hand, the impact of foreign investment on economic development of such poor economies is 
undisputable. Therefore, it is imperative to investigate this question. 
To answer our question, we consider a three-sector general equilibrium model with two tradable 
sectors (exportable and import competing) and a non traded public consumption good sector. 
In this , our framework is closely related to Kemp (2005) , Jones (1975) and Hatzipanayotou and 
Michael (1995). 1 As in -Hatzip~wayotou and Michael (1995) , we assume that the recipient country 
uses foreign aid to finance the production of t he public consumption good. We further assume that 
lSee also Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (1977) . 
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foreign investment takes place in the exportable sector. This last assumption (which is relaxed 
later in the paper) is compatible with the behavior of multinational corporations in less developed 
countries. As our result, we show that such foreign aid impedes foreign investment if importable 
sector is more capital intensive than the public good sector. The reason is quite intuitive. An 
increase in foreign aid draws resources from the importable sector. As the capital intensity of 
importable sector is higher, some labor will also have to be moved from the exportable sector to 
the public good sector. This would reduce the marginal product of foreign capital, which in turn 
reduces foreign investment. Moreover, We investigate whether our result holds for an economy 
where foreign capital is used across the economy, implying that the domestic capital and the foreign 
capital are perfect substitute. We demonstrate that in fact a similar result holds and again factor 
intensity plays a crucial role. 
In addition to being an appealing theoretical exercise, our paper has a vital policy implication. 
Accordingly, there might be a trade-off between foreign aid and foreign investment that policy 
makers should be aware of. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present a model with foreign capital specificity 
in section 2. Section 3 is allocated to the case where foreign capital is used across the economy, 
while section 4 draws the concluding remarks. 
2 Sector specific foreign investment 
Assume a small open recipient economy producing three goods: an exportable, an import compet-
ing, and a nontraded public consumption good. The production technology for the exportable good 
is represented by the production function Xe = Fe(Le , K f ), where xe,Le, and Kf are the quantities 
of production of exportable, labor usage, and the foreign capital used by the exportable sector , re-
spectively. We assume that foreign capital is only used by the exportable sector. This assumption 
is consistent with the observation that the multinational corporations are responsible for most of 
the foreign investments , which are targeted towards exports (we will relax this assumption in the 
next section). The production technology for the import competing sector is Xi = Fi(Li , K i ) , where 
Xi is the production of import competing good, Li and Ki are the labor and capital usage by this 
sector. The public good is produced privately and supplied to the public free of charge by the gov-
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ernment. However, the government finances the production of this good through foreign aid. The 
production technology of the public good is represented by the production function 9 = F(Lg, Kg) , 
where g, Lg ,Kg are the production of public good, labor used in the production of public good, 
and the domestic capital used by the public good sector, respectively. Finally, we assume all the 
neoclassical assumption regarding the above production functions , which exhibit constant returns 
to scale as well as diminishing marginal productivity. 
We further assume that the markets for the tradable sectors are perfect competitive. Therefore, 
we have the following zero profit equilibrium conditions. 
(1) 
(2) 
where aLj , akj , and Pj, j = e, i , are the unit labor cost , unit capital cost , and the price in sector 
j, respectively. Moreover, w, Tj, and T denote the wage rate, the return to foreign capital, and 
the return to domestic capital, respectively. Note also that the return to foreign capital and the 
prices of import competing and exportable goods are determined in the international markets and 
therefore they are fixed for our recipient ecollOlny. 
As production of public consumption good is financed by the foreign aid, we have the following 
equilibrium condition for the public sector. 
(3) 
where aLg and aKg are the optimal unit labor and capital costs, respectively. T denotes foreign 
aid. The left hand side of equation (3) is the cost of public good. 
The resource constraints are given by the following equations. 
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(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
where Land K are the fixed endowments of labor and domestic capital, respectively. Equation 
(4) implies that labor is mobile across all three sectors. Equation (5) states that foreign capital 
is specific to the exportable sector, while equation (6) indicates that domestic capital is mobile 
between the importable sector and the public sector. Equations (1)-(6) constitute our complete 
general equilibrium system with endogenous variables Xe,Xi,g,W,T, and Kf. 
N ow we answer our research question, assuming that foreign investment is specific to the ex-
portable sector: What is the impact of foreign aid on foreign investment? By differentiating 
equations (1)-(3), we obtain: 
aLeW = 0 (7) 
(8) 
(9) 
where circumflex denotes proportional changes. Equations (7)- (8) imply that W = r = O. Using 
this and equations (3) and (9), we conclude that: 
(10) 
Now, by substituting equation (5) into equation (4) and then totally differentiating the resulting 
equation as well as equation (6), we obtain: 
(11 ) 
(12) 
where ALj , j E e, i, g, is the fraction of labor used in sector j and AKj , j E i, g, is the fraction of 
domestic capital used by sector j. Note also that, in deriving equations (11) and (12), we used the 
fact that unit factor costs do not change. 
Finally, by solving equations (11) and (12) and using equation (10), we obtain: 
(13) 
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Note that the terms in brackets will be positive if and only if ki > kg, where kj = 1j , j E [i, g], 
J 
is capital intensity in sector j. Thus, equation (13) concludes the following proposition, which 
formally addresses the question we raised. 
Proposition 1. Assume that foreign aid is used to finance a public consumption good and that 
foreign capital is specific to the exportable sector. Then, foreign aid impedes (encourages) foreign 
investment if the public sector is more labor intensive than the import competing sector. 
This interesting result states that foreign aid could crowd out foreign investment depending 
on factor intensities in the import competing and the public sectors. The economic explanation 
behind this result is somewhat intuitive. An increase in foreign aid used to finance the production 
of a public consumption good would increase the production of public consumption good. This in 
turn results in movements of both capital and labor from the import competing sector to the public 
sector. Assuming that the import competing sector is more capital intensive than the public good 
sector, less labor for each unit of capital moves out of the import competing sector than required 
by the public sector. Thus, some labor must also move from the exportable sector to the public 
sector, resulting in a decrease in marginal productivity of capital in the exportable sector. As 
the return to foreign investment is fixed and determined internationally, due to the small country 
assumption, the level of foreign investment would fall. Now assume that the public sector is more 
capital intensive than the import competing sector. Then, as resources move out of the import 
competing sector, more units of labor for each unit of capital leave this sector than required by 
the public sector. As a result, some of these units of labor must move to the exportable sector, 
causing an increase in marginal productivity of foreign capital. This would result in an increase in 
the usage of foreign capital, leading to an increase in foreign investment. 
3 Mobile capital 
We next investigate whether the result of the preceding section will remain valid if we assume no 
distinction between domestic capital and foreign capital, i.e. we assume foreign investment takes 
place economy wide. To do so, we rewrite our model by assuming that the foreign capital is used 
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in all three sectors. Equations (1)-(3) would then change to: 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
According to the above equilibrium conditions, as there is no distinction between domestic capital 
and foreign capital, the economy-wide rate of return to capital is the internationally determined 
rate of return. Therefore, such a rate of return is fixed for our recipient economy. 
Similarly, the resource constraints would change to: 
(17) 
(18) 
Equation (18) indicates mobility of foreign capital, as well as domestic capital, across all three 
sectors of the economy. Our new complete economic system consists of equations (14)-(18) with 
five endogenous variables Xe,Xi,g,W, and K f . Recall that returns to capital is fixed in this system. 
We now return to our question of whether foreign aid crowds out foreign investment within the 
context of this section. By differentiating equation (14), we obtain equation (7). Furthermore, we 
differentiate equations (15) and (18) to obtain: 
(19) 
(20) 
Similar to the preceding section, we use equations (7) , (19), and (20) to derive equation (10). 
Next, we differentiate resource constraints , i.e. equations (17) and (18) , to get: 
(21) 
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(22) 
where K = K + K f. Note that , as the stock of domestic capital is fixed , dK = dK f implying that 
K~ - dK _ dKf 
- K - K' 
Finally, we use equations (10) , (21), and (22) to obtain: 
(23) 
We use equation (23) to conclude the equivalence of Proposition 1. It states that the answer to 
our question depends on capital intensity ranking. 
Proposition 2. Assume that foreign aid is used to finance a public consumption good and that 
foreign capital is used in all three sectors. Then, an increase in foreign aid decreases (increases) 
foreign investment if ki > ke > kg (kg> ke > ki ). 
Again, according to this proposition, foreign aid may crowd out foreign investment given the 
stated factor intensity ranking. Economic intuition is interesting. First, assume that the import 
competing sector is more capital intensive than the exportable sector and that the capital intensity 
of exportable sector is greater than that 'of public good sector. Then, the expansion of the public 
good sector due to an increase in foreign aid will require movement of all factors from the tradable 
sectors to the public sector. On the one hand, as the import competing sector (and the exportable 
sector) is more capital intensive than the public good sector, the public sector needs less capital 
per unit of labor than released by the tradable sectors. On the other hand, the domestic capital 
is fixed while the foreign capital is variable. In conclusion, the economy as a whole will substitute 
domestic capital for foreign capital, resulting in a decrease in the use of foreign capital. Thus, 
foreign aid crowds out foreign investment. Now, let the public good sector be the most capital 
intensive sector, followed by the exportable sector. An increase in foreign aid expands the public 
sector at the expense of tradable sectors. However , as the public sector is the nlost capital intensive 
sector in the economy, this sector requires more capital for each unit of labor than moved out of 
the tradable sectors. To make up the difference, foreign capital moves in. Thus , under the stated 
factor intensity ranking, foreign aid encourages foreign investment. 
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4 Conclusion 
Some of the foreign aid to developing economies is used to finance public consumption goods. On the 
other hand, foreign investment has played an increasingly important role in economic development 
of such economies. These stylized facts motivated us to question the impact foreign aid may have 
on foreign investment in recipient developing economies. 
We used a three-good general equilibrium model to represent a recipient economy, assuming 
two traded goods and a non-traded public consumption good. First , we considered a case where 
foreign capital is used only in the exportable sector. We demonstrated that an increase in foreign 
aid, used to finance a public consumption good, would discourage foreign investment if the import 
competing sector is more capital intensive than the public good sector. Then, we examined whether 
our result is robust with regard to the assumption of sector specificity of foreign capital. To do 
this , we allowed perfect substitutability of foreign capital and domestic capital. We showed that 
foreign aid would cause a substitution of domestic capital for foreign capital, and thus a reduction 
of foreign capital usage, if the import competing sector is more capital intensive than the exportable 
sector and the exportable sector is more capital intensive than the public sector. 
The possibility of crowding-out effect of foreign aid on foreign investment has a clear and 
imperative policy implication. Policy makers , specially in recipient developing economies, should 
be aware of such a possible trade-off. 
This article opens an entirely new direction to the literature on foreign aid. In addition to its 
theoretical contribution and useful policy implication, our paper provides a foundation for empirical 
investigation of the impacts of foreign aid on foreign investment. 
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1 Introduction 
The literature on income transfer goes as far back to Keynes (1929), where he argued that the 
German reparation payments after WWI had caused a decrease in its terms of trade, known as the 
orthodox view. Jones (1970) took the literature to a new direction and presented a number of cases 
where, in absence of trade barriers, an income transfer could result in an increase in donor's terms 
of trade and therefore pioneered an unorthodox and somewhat paradoxical view. His paper deals 
more with presumption and bias about the effects of the terms of trade of the transferring country 
than the actual effect. That is , the orthodox bias is that the terms of trade of the donor country is 
deteriorated following a transfer. Jones (1970) sets out to reverse that bias on the premise that "the 
real income loss represented by the transfer at initial prices may be mitigated by the 'secondary' 
effects of an improvement in the terms of trade." 
The literature continues to this day and it has taken a number of different avenues. Jones (1975) 
reconsidered the effect of income transfer on terms of trade by assuming the existence of non traded 
goods. Jones (1975) found that the different degrees of demand and supply disparities between 
countries is a prominent factor in determining the effects on a transferring country's terms of trade. 
As well, price sensitivity, both of demanders and producers, as a cause of trade strongly impacts 
terms of trade in a transfer where a non traded good is present. Brecher and Bhagwati (1981), 
Bhagwati et al. (1983) and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1984) indicated the conditions under which 
an income transfer would be immiserizing for the recipient country, thus establishing the welfare 
paradox. Brecher and Bhagwati (1981) made a clear distinction between foreign and national 
income in an economy where foreign ownership is present. When the national and aggregate 
incomes differ, the recipient country experiences a decrease in national welfare, which is contrary to 
the standard results. This immiserizing growth is also shown to occur in stable markets. Bhagwati 
et al. (1983) generalized these results by claiming that this paradox (immiserizing growth to the 
recipient of the transfer) can only occur with market stability if there are certain "distortions" in 
that economy. They set up a three-agent model, where two of the agents engage in a bilateral 
transfer, and the third outside agent is included in order to simulate a multilateral environment. 
After implementing the conditions of the immiserizing growth, though it appeared as if there were 
no distortions, in fact, the absence of optimal taxation existed as the said distortion. Hence, the 
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generalization was established. 
Kemp and Kojima (1985) and Schweinberger (1990) , among others , investigated welfare paradox 
of an income transfer when such aid is tied. Kemp and Kojima (1985) verified that perverse 
outcomes occur in the presence of market stability when dealing with tied aid on the part of the 
recipient or donor. Unlike previous literature establishing the welfare paradox, their work is not 
reliant on an additional country or commodity. Schweinberger (1990) offered a slightly alternative 
~odel to Kemp and Kojima (1985). He claimed the effects of the tied aid puts constraint on the 
spending of the private sector 's income. A surprising result of his model is that if aid is tied in the 
donor 's export market , the donor paradox (enrichment to the donor) cannot occur. Beladi (1990) 
reexamines the welfare effects of international transfers in a two country general equilibriurn nlodel 
of trade in the presence of generalized unemployment. In this context he derives the necessary 
conditions for the occurrence of paradoxical as well as normal results on employment as well as 
welfare. Lahiri and Raimondos (1995) considered the welfare effects of aid tied to quantitative trade 
restrictions. They found that these quantitative distortions do not of themselves cause a transfer 
paradox because unlike price distortions, quotas alone do not bring distortions into other markets. 
In the case of quantitative trade restrictions , the transfer paradox only occurs with quota reform and 
only as a result of the welfare changes associated with that reform. Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 
(1997) investigated foreign aid tied to tariff reforms. They presented conditions where Pareto-
improvement occurs for the recipient and donor countries as well as the third outside country not 
involved in the transfer. By tying aid to changes in tariffs , they showed that theoretically, a certain 
level of welfare can be attained in the donor country, while the tariff reduction will not cause the 
recipient country's tariff revenue to decrease. Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995) assumed that the 
recipient used foreign aid to finance a public consumption good, and they investigated the impact 
on terms of trade of both the recipient and donor. They also showed that the income transfer could 
be welfare enriching for the donor and welfare immiserizing for the recipient. In addition to this, 
they showed that a transfer can increase or decrease world welfare, thus improving or worsening the 
welfare of both countries. Yano and Nugent (1999) examined the impact of development aid on the 
welfare of a small open economy in presence of nontraded goods (as a significant amount of aid is 
spent on nontraded infrastructures) and demonstrated that welfare paradox can take place. They 
claimed that the expansion of nontraded sectors can outweigh the benefits of aid and therefore 
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could result in welfare paradox. However , Choi (2003) indicated, in a set up with two factors 
two tradeable goods and a nontraded good, the terms of trade for a small economy cannot be 
deteriorated. Thus he claimed that Yano and Nugent (1999) condition on nontraded good sector 
is not necessary. 
More recently, Abe and Takarada (2005) attempted to resolve some of the issues surrounding 
the dispute between Kemp and Kojima (1985) and Schweinberger (1990). Their model of tied 
aid showed that when the households of the recipient country have knowledge of the transfers 
and have the ability to trade the purchased goods , no transfer paradoxes occur in the context 
of normal commodities. Kemp (2005) extended the theory of tied aid by creating a model that is 
compatible with non-tradable public consumption goods. He argued that with private consumption 
goods households can resell the aid on world markets , essentially "untying" the aid. The transfer 
paradox, in this context , still exists. Torsvik (2005) examined the implications of donor cooperation 
and mutual aid policy. He showed that donor cooperation is always beneficial when aid contracts 
are used. When contracts are not used, however, cooperation can harm the donor countries involved 
in the transfer. Alesina and Dollar (2000) studied the trends of foreign aid allocation. They find 
that political strategy plays a role as significant as the economic needs of the recipient countries 
in determining who gets what aid. The study reveals that all other things constant , democratic 
countries are granted more aid. And although politics strongly influence foreign aid allocation, the 
economics of recipient countries significantly stimulate foreign direct investments. 
The purpose of this paper is to raise an entirely different question: Does foreign aid crowd out 
foreign investment , given that the foreign aid is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption 
good? On the one hand , the recipient countries are often poor developing countries. On the 
other hand, the impact of foreign investment on economic development of such poor economies is 
undisputable. Therefore, it is imperative to investigate this question. 
To answer our question, we consider a three-sector general equilibrium model with two tradable 
sectors (exportable and import competing) and a non traded public consumption good sector. 
In this, our framework is closely related to Kemp (2005) , Jones (1975) and Hatzipanayotou and 
Michael (1995). 1 As in Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), we assume that the recipient country 
uses foreign aid to finance the production of the public consumption good. We further assume that 
lSee also Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (1977) . 
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foreign investment takes place in the exportable sector. This last assumption (which is relaxed 
later in the paper) is compatible with the behavior of multinational corporations in less developed 
countries. As our result , we show that such foreign aid impedes foreign investment if importable 
sector is more capital intensive than the public good sector. The reason is quite intuitive. An 
increase in foreign aid draws resources from the importable sector. As the capital intensity of 
importable sector is higher, some labor will also have to be moved from the exportable sector to 
the public good sector. This would reduce the marginal product of foreign capital , which in turn 
reduces foreign investment. Moreover , We investigate whether our result holds for an economy 
where foreign capital is used across the economy, implying that the domestic capital and the foreign 
capital are perfect substitute. We demonstrate that in fact a similar result holds and again factor 
intensity plays a crucial role. 
In addition to being an appealing theoretical exercise, our paper has a vital policy implication. 
Accordingly, there might be a trade-off between foreign aid and foreign investment that policy 
makers should be aware of. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present a model with foreign capital specificity 
in section 2. Section 3 is allocated to the case where foreign capital is used across the economy, 
while section 4 draws the concluding remarks. 
2 Sector specific foreign investment 
Assume a small open recipient economy producing three goods: an exportable, an import compet-
ing, and a nontraded public consumption good. The production technology for the exportable good 
is represented by the production function Xe = Fe(Le, K f ) , where x e,Le, and Kf are the quantities 
of production of exportable, labor usage, and the foreign capital used by the exportable sector, re-
spectively. We assume that foreign capital is only used by the exportable sector. This assumption 
is consistent with the observation that the multinational corporations are responsible for most of 
the foreign investments, which are targeted towards exports (we will relax this assumption in the 
next section). The production technology for the import competing sector is Xi = Fi(Li , K i ), where 
Xi is the production of import competing good, Li and K i are the labor and capital usage by this 
sector. The public good is produced privately and supplied to the public free of charge by the gov-
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ernment. However , the government finances the production of this good through foreign aid. The 
production technology of the public good is represented by the production function 9 = F(Lg , Kg) , 
where g , Lg ,Kg are the production of public good, labor used in the production of public good , 
and the domestic capital used by the public good sector, respectively. Finally, we assume all the 
neoclassical assumption regarding the above production functions , which exhibit constant returns 
to scale as well as diminishing marginal productivity. 
We further assume that the markets for the tradable sectors are perfect competitive. Therefore, 
we have the following zero profit equilibrium conditions. 
(1) 
(2) 
where aLj , akj , and Pj , j = e, i , are the unit labor cost , unit capital cost , and the price in sector 
j , respectively. Moreover , W , r f' and r denote the wage rate, the return to foreign capital, and 
the return to domestic capital , respectively. Note also that the return to foreign capital and the 
prices of import competing and exportable goods are determined in the international markets and 
therefore they are fixed for our recipient ecollOluy. 
As production of public consumption good is financed by the foreign aid , we have the following 
equilibrium condition for the public sector. 
(3) 
where aLg and aKg are the optimal unit labor and capital costs, respectively. T denotes foreign 
aid. The left hand side of equation (3) is the cost of public good. 
The resource constraints are given by the following equations. 
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(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
where Land K are the fixed endowments of labor and domestic capital, respectively. Equation 
(4) implies that labor is mobile across all three sectors. Equation (5) states that foreign capital 
is specific to the exportable sector, while equation (6) indicates that domestic capital is mobile 
between the importable sector and the public sector. Equations (1)-(6) constitute our complete 
general equilibrium system with endogenous variables Xe,Xi,g,W,T, and Kj. 
Now we answer our research question, assuming that foreign investment is specific to the ex-
portable sector: What is the impact of foreign aid on foreign investment? By differentiating 
equations (1)-(3), we obtain: 
aLeW = 0 (7) 
(8) 
(9) 
where circumflex denotes proportional changes. Equations (7)-(8) imply that W = T = O. Using 
this and equations (3) and (9), we conclude that: 
(10) 
Now, by substituting equation (5) into equation (4) and then totally differentiating the resulting 
equation as well as equation (6), we obtain: 
(11) 
(12) 
where ALj, j E e, i, g, is the fraction of labor used in sector j and AKj, j E i, g, is the fraction of 
domestic capital used by sector j. Note also that , in deriving equations (11) and (12), we used the 
fact that unit factor costs do not change. 
Finally, by solving equations (11) and (12) and using equation (10), we obtain: 
(13) 
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Note that the terms in brackets will be positive if and only if ki > kg, where kj = ~j , j E [i , g], 
J 
is capital intensity in sector j. Thus, equation (13) concludes the following proposition, which 
formally addresses the question we raised. 
Proposition 1. Assume that foreign aid is used to finance a public consumption good and that 
foreign capital is specific to the exportable sector. Then, foreign aid impedes (encourages) foreign 
investment if the public sector is more labor intensive than the import competing sector. 
This interesting result states that foreign aid could crowd out foreign investment depending 
on factor intensities in the import competing and the public sectors. The economic explanation 
behind this result is somewhat intuitive. An increase in foreign aid used to finance the production 
of a public consumption good would increase the production of public consumption good. This in 
turn results in movements of both capital and labor from the import competing sector to the public 
sector. Assuming that the import competing sector is more capital intensive than the public good 
sector, less labor for each unit of capital moves out of the import competing sector than required 
by the public sector. Thus, some labor must also move from the exportable sector to the public 
sector, resulting in a decrease in marginal productivity of capital in the exportable sector. As 
the return to foreign investment is fixed and determined internationally, due to the small country 
assumption, the level of foreign investment would fall. Now assume that the public sector is more 
capital intensive than the import competing sector. Then, as resources move out of the import 
competing sector, more units of labor for each unit of capital leave this sector than required by 
the public sector. As a result, some of these units of labor must move to the exportable sector, 
causing an increase in marginal productivity of foreign capital. This would result in an increase in 
the usage of foreign capital, leading to an increase in foreign investment. 
3 Mobile capital 
We next investigate whether the result of the preceding section will remain valid if we assume no 
distinction between domestic capital and foreign capital , i.e. we assume foreign investment takes 
place economy wide. To do so, we rewrite our model by assuming that the foreign capital is used 
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in all three sectors. Equations (1)-(3) would then change to: 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
According to the above equilibrium conditions, as there is no distinction between domestic capital 
and foreign capital, the economy-wide rate of return to capital is the internationally determined 
rat e of return. Therefore, such a rate of return is fixed for our recipient economy. 
Similarly, the resource constraints would change to: 
(17) 
(18) 
Equation (18) indicates mobility of foreign capital , as well as domestic capital, across all three 
sectors of the economy. Our new complete economic system consists of equations (14)-(18) with 
five endogenous variables Xe,Xi,g,W , and K f . Recall that returns to capital is fixed in this system. 
We now return to our question of whether foreign aid crowds out foreign investment within the 
context of this section. By differentiating equation (14) , we obtain equation (7). Furthermore, we 
differentiate equations (15) and (18) to obtain: 
(19) 
(20) 
Similar to the preceding section, we use equations (7) , (19) , and (20) to derive equation (10). 
Next , we differentiate resource constraints , i. e. equations (17) and (18) , to get: 
(21) 
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(22) 
where K = K + Kj. Note that, as the stock of domestic capital is fixed , dK = dKj implying that 
KA _ dK _ dKf 
- K - K· 
Finally, we use equations (10), (21) , and (22) to obtain: 
(23) 
We use equation (23) to conclude the equivalence of Proposition 1. It states that the answer to 
our question depends on capital intensity ranking. 
Proposition 2. Assume that foreign aid is used to finance a public consumption good and that 
foreign capital is used in all three sectors. Then, an increase in foreign aid decreases (increases) 
foreign investment if k i > ke > kg (kg > ke > k i ). 
Again, according to this proposition, foreign aid may crowd out foreign investment given the 
stated factor intensity ranking. Economic intuition is interesting. First, assume that the import 
competing sector is more capital intensive than the exportable sector and that the capital intensity 
of exportable sector is greater than that of public good sector. Then, the expansion of the public 
good sector due to an increase in foreign aid will require movement of all factors from the tradable 
sectors to the public sector. On the one hand, as the import competing sector (and the exportable 
sector) is more capital intensive than the public good sector , the public sector needs less capital 
per unit of labor than released by the tradable sectors. On the other hand, the domestic capital 
is fixed while the foreign capital is variable. In conclusion, the economy as a whole will substitute 
domestic capital for foreign capital, resulting in a decrease in the use of foreign capital. Thus, 
foreign aid crowds out foreign investment. Now, let the public good sector be the most capital 
intensive sector , followed by the exportable sector. An increase in foreign aid expands the public 
sector at the expense of tradable sectors. However, as the public sector is the most capital intensive 
sector in the economy, this sector requires more capital for each unit of labor than moved out of 
the tradable sectors. To make up the difference, foreign capital moves in. Thus , under the stated 
factor intensity ranking, foreign aid encourages foreign investment. 
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4 Conclusion 
Some of the foreign aid to developing economies is used to finance public consumption goods. On the 
other hand, foreign investment has played an increasingly important role in economic development 
of such economies. These stylized facts motivated us to question the impact foreign aid may have 
on foreign investment in recipient developing economies. 
We used a three-good general equilibrium model to represent a recipient economy, assuming 
two traded goods and a non-traded public consumption good. First , we considered a case where 
foreign capital is used only in the exportable sector. We demonstrated that an increase in foreign 
aid , used to finance a public consumption good , would discourage foreign investment if the import 
competing sector is more capital intensive than the public good sector. Then, we examined whether 
our result is robust with regard to the assumption of sector specificity of foreign capital. To do 
this, we allowed perfect substitutability of foreign capital and domestic capital. We showed that 
foreign aid would cause a substitution of domestic capital for foreign capital, and thus a reduction 
of foreign capital usage, if the import competing sector is more capital intensive than the exportable 
sector and the exportable sector is more capital intensive than the public sector. 
The possibility of crowding-out effect of foreign aid on foreign investment has a clear and 
imperative policy implication. Policy makers, specially in recipient developing economies, should 
be aware of such a possible trade-off. 
This article opens an entirely new direction to the literature on foreign aid. In addition to its 
theoretical contribution and useful policy implication, our paper provides a foundation for empirical 
investigation of the impacts of foreign aid on foreign investment. 
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